

HALTING HATE:

How to Use the Interruption Model to
Counter Hate-Motivated Violence

STOP
THE VIOLENCE

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GENERAL BACKGROUND

...we can identify warning signs prior to an act of violence. While not every act of violence will be prevented, this report indicates that targeted violence may be preventable, if appropriate systems are in place to identify concerning behaviors, gather information to assess the risk of violence, and utilize community resources to mitigate the risk.

United States Secret Service, National Threat Assessment Center,
Mass Attacks in Public Spaces—2018 (2019, p. 2, emphasis in original)

INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF THIS MANUAL

This manual is designed to assist governmental and non-governmental organizations in adapting the use of a proven approach of violence prevention, which we call the interruption model, to address hate-motivated violence. This model focuses on interrupting violence before it happens.

Research shows that most violence motivated by hate is perpetrated by individuals and small groups who are largely acting on their own, not necessarily at the request or with the consent of a hate group (Levin & McDevitt 2002). McDevitt, Levin, and Bennett identify four categories of hate-motivated crime: “In thrill crimes...the offender is set off by a desire for excitement and power; defensive hate crime offenders are provoked by feeling a need to protect their resources under conditions they consider to be threatening; retaliatory offenders are inspired by a desire to avenge a perceived degradation or assault on their group; and mission offenders perceive themselves as crusaders who hope to cleanse the earth of evil” (2002, p. 306, emphasis added).

McDevitt et al. (2002) analyzed 169 cases of hate crimes that were investigated by the Boson Police Department’s Community Disorders Unit. The crimes occurred between July 1991 and December 1992. Of those cases, 66% were categorized as being motivated by pursuit of a thrill; 25% as defensive; 8% retaliatory; and, only one, less than 1%, as mission (2002, p. 307). Using the same categories, Phillips, analyzing data from a county in New Jersey, found that of the 30 cases she analyzed, 43.3% fell into the thrill category; 3.3% in retaliation; 3.3% in defensive; and 13.3% in mission. She found that 36.6% of the cases were “unclassifiable” (2009, p. 894).

This manual does not address some of the macro-level, structural reasons people become hateful—that is, it does not focus heavily on structural prevention. Instead, it focuses on operational prevention in the moment, when violence is imminent, when people are clearly contemplating harming or killing others.

The interruption model was pioneered by Cure Violence Global (hereinafter simply referred to as Cure Violence or CV), a Chicago-based Non-Governmental Organization (NGO).¹ Cure Violence’s interruption model has been evaluated rigorously by research teams, which conclude that using the model results in statistically significant reductions in the incidence of violence. The use of the interruption model to address hate is in its infancy, however.² To our knowledge, the only time it has been used in this way was a program to reintegrate religious militants in Morocco to reduce recidivism, violence, and foreign fighter recruitment. There has not, however, been an evaluation of that project’s impact.

Obviously, we believe the interruption model has promise as a way of preventing hate-motivated violence. There are other kinds of violence—including that which is perpetrated by lone wolf terrorists, assassins and school attackers—that could potentially be addressed by using the interruption model as well.³ As with hate-motivated violence, we do not have evidence as to how well the interruption model would work in preventing these kinds of violence. It is the primary goal of this manual to encourage pilot projects with rigorous research methods that will identify in what conditions and to which types of violence the interruption model can be effectively applied. The only way we will find out what works is if we initiate projects using the model, collect baseline data, measure the results, compile the findings, publish the findings, and develop our understanding of what is effective and what is not.

PART I

VIOLENCE AS DISEASE



Video 1: Gary Slutkin on treating violence as a contagious disease

CV views violence as a disease, and the prevention of violence as an epidemiological challenge. Watch the [Ted Talk](#) by Gary Slutkin, MD, founder of Cure Violence, above.

More elaborate background on the interruption model and treatment of violence as a contagious disease can be found at:

Gary Slutkin, Charles Ransford and Daria Zvetina, “How the Health Sector Can Reduce Violence by Treating it as a Contagion,” *AMA Journal of Ethics*, January 2018, Volume 20, Number 1: 47-55, found at <https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/sites/journalofethics.ama-assn.org/files/2018-04/nlit1-1801.pdf>
Gary Slutkin, “[Contagion of Violence: Workshop Summary](#),”

Forum on Global Violence Prevention; Board on Global Health; Institute of Medicine; National Research Council. Washington (DC): National Academies Press (US), February 6, 2013, found at <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK207245/>

American Public Health Association, “Violence is a Public Health Issue: Public Health is Essential to Understanding and Treating Violence in the U.S.,” November 13, 2018, Policy Number: 20185, found at <https://www.apha.org/policies-and-advocacy/public-health-policy-statements/policy-database/2019/01/28/violence-is-a-public-health-issue>

VIOLENCE PREVENTION AS COMPARED TO VIOLENCE INTERRUPTION

Violence prevention is a broader term than violence interruption. Violence prevention includes, but is not limited to:

- Structural changes that bring greater justice and equity to a society.
- Programs that facilitate more contact between groups.
- Social service, educational and economic development initiatives aimed at creating alternatives to violence.

Violence interruption, on the other hand, is focused on situations when violence is imminent. It is not structural; it is aimed at halting a process that is quickly moving toward physical violence.

It can involve, among others:

- listening, allowing the potential perpetrator to express him or herself and articulate why violence is being contemplated;
- apologies, if someone has been harmed;
- persuasion;
- negotiation when tensions are acute;
- getting in the way physically between potential perpetrators and victims;
- detention before harm is done; or,
- encouraging potential victims to leave the location of potential violence.

Gary Slutkin, Charles Ransford and R. Brent, “Cure violence: Treating violence as a contagious disease.” In Michael D. Maltz and Sephen K. Rice (Eds.), *Envisioning Criminology: Researchers on Research as a Process of Discovery*. New York: Springer, 2015, pp. 43-56.

As with addiction and obesity, treating violence as a disease is not without its critics. We encourage you, however, to focus on the results of using the interruption model. Regardless of whether violence is a disease, the use of epidemiological methods to prevent it has yielded impressive results, as explained next.



THE INTERRUPTION MODEL

CV takes a public health approach grounded in an understanding that violence follows an infectious process: it is acquired through exposure to violence as a victim or witness, and is biologically processed, perpetuated through social norms and peer reinforcement, and can be prevented using disease control and behavior change methodology. The Cure Violence approach is premised on the belief that individuals and communities can change for the better; that credible messengers, community partners, and strategic partnerships are keys to success. The immediate and long-term consequences of exposure to violence (beyond injury and death) are well-documented and profound: heightened risk of acute and chronic diseases, behavioral health symptoms and conditions (including post-traumatic stress), and, in the case of chronic or severe exposure, hyper-activation of the sympathetic nervous system, all of which shorten life expectancy and reduce quality of life.

Research has demonstrated that violence follows an epidemic process of social contagion. A study by Green et al. concludes that social contagion accounted for 63.1% of shooting incidents in Chicago from 2006 to 2014 (2017). Social cognitive theory posits that a key mechanism underlying transmission is imitation: Individuals learn violent behavior by experience, observation, and replication. Observational learning results in the normalization of

violence as an appropriate response to certain stimuli.

CV takes a health approach grounded in an understanding that violence follows an infectious process. It is acquired and processed, perpetuated through social norms and peer reinforcement, and can be prevented using disease control and behavior change methodology.

The CV model breaks with traditional paradigms and differs from previously applied solutions in many of the places it has been implemented. Studies have shown that most behaviors – and most especially violent behavior due to its salience – are acquired or learned. Behaviors can also be unlearned (Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, 2013).

Studies show that exposure to violence increases one’s risk of becoming violent, transmitting from one person to another. Violence is transmitted like a disease (through social learning, social norms and neurological processes). If you are exposed to violence, you are more likely to become violent. People chronically exposed to violence are more than 30 times more



Source 1: Image from Cure Violence website

likely to become chronically violent (Spano et al., 2010). Social norms, scripts, and perceived social expectations further exacerbate this contagion by encouraging violent behavior to spread. Social cognitive theory posits that a key mechanism underlying transmission is imitation: Individuals learn violent behavior by experience, observation, and replication. Observational learning results in the normalization of violence as an appropriate response to certain stimuli/triggers.

The use of trained credible messengers is a central tenet of public health practice for stopping epidemics, as these individuals are most likely to influence change within difficult-to-reach populations. The Cure Violence approach uses violence interrupters and outreach workers, both of whom are credible messengers. Interrupters respond to disrupt imminent violence. Outreach workers serve as case workers focused on long term behavior change which includes arranging for wrap-around services for individuals prone to violence. The services help to reduce or prevent the spread of violence. Wrap-around services can include, but are not limited to, counseling, assistance in completing education, job training, and help in getting a job.



Source 2: Image from Cure Violence website

Another major component of CV’s interruption model is to facilitate norm change. Through norm change, there is a tipping point that needs to be reached. One message used by Cure Violence is the slogan “Don’t Shoot, I want to Grow Up” alongside a picture of a young child. This slogan is used in conjunction with a much more comprehensive set of activities designed to change norms. Public education campaigns and associated materials are developed to establish new norms, attitudes, and behaviors that discourage violence. Specific community-norm-change activities are not designed to blame, eulogize, etc., but to raise awareness, to sensitize communities to unhealthy behaviors which have been normalized and to create a space to support the healing process. Small group sessions, as an example of a community activity, may be an effective strategy and platform for safe discussions on: attitudes and beliefs that drive violent behavior; strategies for coping with trauma; ideas on how to address grievances productively and nonviolently. These group sessions also provide a platform to help identify and shift deeply entrenched norms that promote or sustain violence.

To summarize, there are three main components of interventions designed to stop epidemics: (1) interrupt transmission; (2) prevent future spread; and (3) change group norms. Based on the World Health Organization’s epidemic control approach, these components are elaborated upon in the figure below.

The Cure Violence model is non-judgmental. It seeks to understand the reasons people feel the way they do. It acknowledges those feeling but says it is not okay to become violent.

Outreach workers also engage in interruption. Typically, CV recruits interrupters and outreach workers on the basis of four qualifications: (1) credibility within the wider community; (2) relationships with individuals at the highest risk of violence; (3) capacity to detect and mediate violent events/ conflicts; and (4) previous relevant work or volunteer experience. Training covers violence as a health problem, detection and interruption techniques, risk assessment and reduction, crisis intervention, communication techniques, community mapping, and behavior and norm change theory/practice.

Some interrupters are from the group they seek to keep from becoming violent—such as a former gang member helping existing gang members not become violent. Other interrupters are people who have influence for other reasons—teachers, coaches, community leaders, and faith leaders, for instance. When identifying interrupters, ask people “who would you listen to?”



Video 2: Children See, Children Do: A film about how children learn




Figure 1: Three main components of Cure Violence’s Approach, from Cure Violence website

EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INTERRUPTION MODEL

Multiple independent evaluations have found that the Cure Violence model results in large, statistically significant reductions in violence. For instance, Skogan et al. found 41% to 73% reductions in shootings in Chicago neighborhoods (2009), Webster et al. found 34% and 56% percent decreases in neighborhoods in Baltimore and decreased acceptance of the use of violence (2011), and Delgado et al. found a 63% reduction in shootings in New York City (2017). Evaluations have also determined that the model is successful at reducing the acceptance of the use of violence, improving police-community relations, linking participants to services and community resources, and that CV workers become important role models for participants.

CV’s adaptation and replication calls for the identification of and collaboration with local partner organizations that have the capacity, credibility, and desire to operate a local program, with CV providing start-up training, ongoing technical assistance, a peer learning network, and process evaluation to ensure fidelity to the approach. This model diffusion approach capitalizes on the relative strengths and expertise of both organizations, with

local partners bringing a deep familiarity with the community, historical context, and relationships with other local organizations and institutions, and CV sharing its expertise in the health-based violence prevention approach and the breadth of its implementation experience.

In Latin America and the Caribbean, CV is supporting the work of local organizations in several locations – Mexico, Trinidad, Jamaica, Argentina, El Salvador, Honduras, Columbia, Belize, and Puerto Rico. In the case of San Pedro de Sula, Honduras, local partners implemented an adaptation beginning April 2013 with 10 interrupters who have interrupted over 1,000 potentially lethal conflicts. Site data show an 88% reduction in shootings and killings and official data show an 80% reduction in the target zone (Ransford et al., 2017). An independent evaluation of the replication in Trinidad and Tobago found a 45% decline in violent crime in the target area and a 38% reduction in gunshot wound admissions to the Port of Spain General Hospital (Maguire, 2018).

ADAPTATION OF THE INTERRUPTION MODEL TO ADDRESS HATE-MOTIVATED VIOLENCE

The CV Model can be adapted to address many forms of violence (community, interpersonal, domestic, suicidal, etc.) within multiple contexts (hospitals, schools, detention facilities, etc.), taking into consideration cultural, political, historical, social, and other relevant aspects of the situation. Community specific considerations must be made throughout the planning and implementation process to include identification of additional high need areas, local dynamics and norms related to violence, potential local partners, and local protocols and laws that may impact the work. The identification and interruption strategies vary from adaptation to adaptation, but all are informed by the same previously delineated components used to reverse epidemic disease outbreaks.

In adapting the interruption model to address hate-motivated violence, it is important to understand what we mean hate groups. A hate group is defined an organization which espouses a shared common vision, belief or activity that negatively targets, with bias (or prejudice), and adversely affects property or persons extended protection under the law. The bias (prejudice) relates to race, religion, sexual orientation, disability, ethnicity, gender, and gender identity (DOJ, 2019 and FBI, 2019). Hate groups are structured organizations with members and internal leadership. Hate groups also recruit people to espouse discriminatory and hateful ideologies towards others (Woolf & Hulsizer 2004). Generally, affiliation with hate groups involves a formal membership, attendance at meetings, making financial and in-kind contributions, or actively participating in hate group activities

at the direction of the organization.

Definitive lines of hate group membership may become blurred with the use of technology. Social media platforms allow hate groups to promote hateful ideologies from almost anywhere in the world. Their messages can reach a global audience. Physical proximity to a hate group thus becomes less important in the propagation of hateful ideology. Communication at a distance that is not coupled with messages delivered in person can be misinterpreted, causing violent action even if such violence was not intended by the hate group. Hate-motivated violence is not always perpetrated by hate groups. It is sometimes perpetrated by individuals and small groups who are not formally affiliated with a hate group.

In order to ensure sustained reductions in hate-motivated violence, adaptation of the CV interruption model should include a comprehensive public engagement and education strategy to change community norms related to the acceptability of this form of violence. Such a public education effort should focus on social scripts, prejudice and ideologies relating to racism, xenophobia, antisemitism, or homophobia, or a combination of these. By creating public discourse and facilitating public events that reject the use of violence, it is possible to decrease the normalization of learned behaviors. Partnerships with local organizations and agencies in the target communities are critical for the successful implementation of this program component.

Below, we list what we know about the interruption model, juxtaposed to implications of applying the model to preventing hate-motivated violence.

CREDIBLE MESSENGERS

As noted, a public health understanding of behavior change holds that community norms are shifted by “change agents” who are credible opinion leaders, and from the target group (Rogers, 2003). In Cure Violence’s experience, the best change agents for detecting and interrupting violent events have in many cases lived the same type of lives as those who are being affected by the violence. As part of the scientific literature review and key stakeholder or informant interviews, Cure Violence, with the support of subject matter experts (on hate-motivated violence, hate groups, thrill seeking, etc.), should develop the profile of interrupters who will be seen as credible and trustworthy within these populations. This should include the identification of characteristics that enhance an individual’s ability to reach/connect with highest risk individuals and penetrate a trust barrier that commonly exists within high risk populations.

Credible messenger characteristics include:

- 1. being from a similar community,

- 2. being viewed as trusted insiders,
- 3. having empathy/similar life experiences (e.g., history of experiences similar to those that hate-motivated violence perpetrators may have experienced, history of violence, etc.) as those within the high risk population,
- 4. having current networks within a high risk population/ community,
- 5. being knowledgeable about community and local dynamics, and
- 6. being passionate about helping others. Credible messengers also must understand (and be trained) to engage with participants without judgment or demonization based on identity, affiliations, or ideologies. Instead of operating through a punitive lens, this public health approach targets behaviors that adversely impact reintegration and shifts mindsets away from attitudes and behaviors that result in the use of violence.

With the initial CV model focused on preventing gang violence, the person who intervenes to prevent violence must be a credible messenger.

They are known by those with the highest likelihood to engage in violence.

In the case of hate-motivated potential perpetrators, the violence is relatively random and geographically dispersed. Rather than having interrupters in the field observing and communicating for early warning and early response, with hate-motivated violence, the warnings will need to come primarily from the crowd, complemented by analysis of crime data (the trends of which may indicate an outbreak of an epidemic of violence), and possibly by mining big data. Given the amount of territory, there needs to be a centralized headquarters for data processing that can send interrupters to different locations quickly. The interrupters can have a similar background as potential perpetrators (in this case, former affiliation with a hate group and maybe former imprisonment for hate crimes). But

...it is unlikely that these headquarters-based interrupters will be known by the potential perpetrators.

Therefore, we suggest that consideration be given to having a third-party accompanier who is known by the potential perpetrators—a former coach, a respected civic leader, a preacher, for instance. Identifying these third-party accompaniers can be done by contacting the crowd (which is possible because they initiated communication using their mobile phones or email accounts) asking: “Who does this person we are concerned about know and trust....Can you help us contact the known and trusted person (or persons)?” If such a person or persons are identified

and recruited quickly, they can accompany the headquarters-based interrupter in approaching the potential perpetrator. This, of course, will not always be possible, but it is a configuration that might be more effective than if a stranger shows up without someone who is known. See Figure 2 (see next page) for a visual comparison of the original CV interruption model and this proposed interruption model to address hate-motivated violence.

In the initial CV interruption model, interrupters need to “keep their ear to the ground” to spot early warning signs of potential violence. Given the substantial territory of where hate-motivated violence can emerge, and the randomness of that emergence, it is our hope that a combination of public education campaigns, collection of data from bystanders (the “crowd,” hence the term crowdsourcing), digital mapping, pattern recognition and data mining can satisfy the need for early warning. We say it is our hope because we are not sure yet what kinds of signs presage hate-motivated violence. For instance, imagine a group of young men who are partially intoxicated who come up with an idea to do a hate crime. The prospect of doing so is thrilling. Are they going

to take the time to post something on social media about their violent intentions? If so, how much time will there be between the decision to become violent and the onset of violence?⁴

The number of interrupters needed is a function of how many groups are involved (with each possibly needing a different interrupter), the typical amount of time needed to respond, and the amount of time it takes to travel to the location of potential violence. In the case of hate-motivated potential perpetrators, determining the number of interrupters needed will require defining the target areas, determining the size of target areas, and identifying the characteristics of credible messengers for the targeted population.

TRAINING

Interrupters need training, and that involves days, not hours. The Cure Violence training curriculum developed for other adaptations consists of an initial 80 hours of training followed by quarterly booster trainings of approximately 72 hours. An additional 40 hours of in-service training takes place over the course of a year. The training programs are designed to ensure staff members are competent to implement all the major components of the model. Competency is measured through pre- and post-tests to assess comprehension of the material and observation in the field. The training programs cover topics related to detection and interruption techniques including engagement with people at highest risk of becoming violent, risk assessment and reduction, crisis intervention, communication techniques (e.g., motivational interviewing), community mapping, and changing behaviors and norms. Training also covers strategies related to implementation including target area planning, resource development, management of community training programs and activities, team management, and the use of data to inform implementation.

promotion) for at-risk individuals, families and the larger community. The Cure Violence Norm Change Toolkit outlines a structured process for mapping and convening community stakeholders and providers. It explains how to facilitate community conversations to change norms.

For this adaptation these training programs will be customized, as warranted, to address hate motivated violence. An additional set of training workshops will need to be developed with content area expert consultants to equip interrupters with the necessary skills to work with the target population and engage with individuals who are at risk of perpetuating hate-motivated violence.

TIMEFRAME

Projects need to be implemented over a period of years to ensure continuity of the work. Although reductions in violence typically occur within the first few months of a project, long-term implementation is needed to address the epidemic nature of violence. Typically, 3 to 5 years are needed. Projects will not be successful if implemented for one or two years.

A critical component of this training is focused on trauma-informed practices and worker self-care and support. These health workers confront violence and its traumatic aftermath daily. They themselves often have had exposure to violence. They too have their own histories of trauma. Cure Violence’s trauma-informed practice training is focused on understanding and recognizing the symptoms and impact of trauma in oneself and others and techniques for engaging with people who have experienced traumatic events in a manner that is supportive, does no harm (i.e., is not inadvertently retraumatizing), and encourages help-seeking, as needed. The approach to worker self-care is based upon existing research and theory on first responders and secondary trauma which emphasizes self-management and peer-support strategies.


With the adaptation of the interruption model to address hate-motivated violence, extensive training will only be possible for interrupters. The training will need to include the development of “coaching on the run” of third-party accompaniers. In addition, interrupters will need to learn how to spot early warning signs acquired through crowdsourcing, how to delete messages that lack credibility, and how to determine when warnings are serious enough to warrant action.

NORM CHANGE

Cure Violence’s Norm Change Toolkit is adapted from the World Health Organization’s Communication for Behavioural Impact (COMBI): A toolkit for behavioural and social communication in outbreak response (2012), which offers an evidence-based framework, tools, and information for designing communication and behavioral interventions (disease control and health

**COMPARISON OF ORIGINAL INTERRUPTION MODEL
with an Adaptation to Address Hate-Motivated Violence**

ORIGINAL MODEL



ADAPTATION MODEL




Figure 2: Comparison of Original Interruption Model and an Adaptation to Address Hate-Motivated Violence

FUNDING

Using the interruption model requires an investment in interrupters. In the case of interrupting gang violence, Cure Violence estimates that it costs a minimum of \$500,000 to get a project initiated in one neighborhood with two groups. The cost goes up the more groups and more neighborhoods there are. In the case of projects designed to interrupt hate-motivated violence, the costs are also likely to be high. In addition to interrupters, there will need to be staff hired who are experts in the intensive use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs). As for how many interrupters will need to be hired, we suggest that it be similar to fire departments, though not in the same extensive concentration. It is reasonable to assume each large metropolitan area will need full-time, paid interrupters, with coverage around the clock working at a central headquarters. Keep in mind that vetting of information for serious threats by interrupters is labor-intensive, and that can significantly increase the number of full-time staff members needed. In less populated areas, trained volunteers can potentially serve as interrupters, comparable to the operations of volunteer fire departments.

A budget for an initiative to prevent hate-motivated violence would need to be allocated within categories shown in Table 1.

Salaries and Wages	Costs per year	Total costs
One supervisor of the overall project		
Full-time outreach workers for major metropolitan areas (who work in three shifts during the week), who also serve as verification specialists who curate crowdsourced information)		
Outreach workers per major metropolitan area (who work weekends)		
ICT experts to manage digital mapping, trend analysis, visualization, pattern recognition, statistical analysis of time series data, and data mining		
Fringe benefits		
Health insurance		
Life insurance		
Equipment		
Computers		
Smartphones		
Travel		
Mileage		
Hotel expenses		
Other travel expenses		
Material and supplies		
Publication costs		
Public education funding, using social media, brochures, billboards and other forms of mass communication		
Other		
ICTs		
Mobile phones and cost of yearly contracts		
Internet service		
Subscription for a data mining service, such as Echosec		
Consulting services		
Conceptualization, implementing partner vetting, training and technical support by Cure Violence		
Indirect Costs		
Total Project Costs		

Table 1: Budget categories and items

Table 2: Categories of hate-motivated violence, descriptions and potential sources of early warning data (quoted from or adapted from McDevitt et al., 2002, p. 306; and Phillips, 2009).

INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES

With a digital mapping and crowdsourcing platform like Ushahidi, information on potential perpetrators can be solicited and derived from the crowd. These are steps in implementing a crowdsourcing approach that serves as a proxy for interrupters having their “ears to the ground”:

1. Contacting the crowd in the area from which the early warning is emanating;
2. Contacting the crowd via phone for more specific information about the person who is showing evidence that violence is being contemplated—that is, verification that a threat exists;
3. Determining if there is sufficient evidence for law enforcement authorities to take swift action within the confines of the law and, if so, contacting them immediately;
4. Assuming law enforcement would not have sufficient evidence, asking members of the crowd for names and contact information of people who are influential with the potential perpetrators (such as a relative or authority figure) who can potentially serve as third-party accompaniers;
5. Reaching out to potential third-party accompaniers, eliciting their support for intervention, asking if one or more of them will accompany the headquarters-based interrupter;
6. Having an interrupter go to the location of the potential perpetrator, along with a third-party accompanier (if there is one able and willing to help);
7. Intervening with potential perpetrators in time to prevent violence; and
8. Engaging potential perpetrators in an assortment of individually designed wrap-around services.

LENGTH OF THE “LULL”

When interrupting hate-motivated violence, time is of the essence. Horowitz, in his cross-national study of ethnic violence, observed how there is a period of consensus-building to become violent between a precipitating event and the onset of violence. He refers to the consensus-building period as a “lull” (2002). To

our knowledge, the length of the lull between a precipitating event and violence has not been measured, except for violence during a separatist revolt in Sri Lanka. Bock found that the lull was two days or less in the overwhelming number of violent incidents there (2012). Of course, hate-motivated violence could have a shorter, or longer, lull. That is a question for future research. To the extent that hate-motivated violence is in pursuit of a thrill, it seems likely that the lull will be short.

The pattern identified by Horowitz (2002) is that there is a precipitating event, followed by a lull, followed by violence. The lull is when there is consensus-building within a group or rationalization by an individual for violence. It is possible that statistical tools can be developed to assess probabilities of hate-motivated violence within, say, metropolitan statistical areas, and these can be combined with distance and traffic patterns to yield a recommended number of interrupters.

It is important to note, however, that Horowitz found in the case of ethnic riots that another pattern, though less frequently seen, is when there is consensus-building for violence, then a precipitating event, and then violence without a lull. So, for instance, if there is a person or group of people whose religion has been denigrated who create a consensus that if their religion is denigrated again, they will respond with violence, then if there is denigration, violence will follow swiftly. In this case, they might have already purchased weapons and ammunition, stashed away for future use if needed.⁵

Keep in mind that it is unlikely that all four categories identified by McDevitt et al. (2002) will have a precipitating event. Phillips found that in the case of hate-motivated crime where perpetrators seek a thrill the “cases appear to have no clear precipitating event” (2009, p. 895). Similarly, for hate-motivated crime due to mission, there “[n]eed not be a precipitating event” (2009, p. 888). Only the defensive and the retaliatory categories showed evidence of precipitating events (2009, p. 888). Therefore, unless future research shows otherwise, it is reasonable to assume the pattern identified by Horowitz described above will tend to be found only in the defensive and retaliatory categories. A summary is found in Table 2 below.

Category	Description	Potential Sources of Early Warning Data
Thrill	Offenders desire excitement and power	Social media postings, crowd-sourced data, big data
Defensive	Offenders are provoked by feeling a need to protect their resources under conditions they consider to be threatening	Precipitating event, social media postings, crowd-sourced data, big data
Retaliatory	Offenders are inspired by a desire to avenge a perceived degradation or assault on their group	Precipitating event, social media postings, crowd-sourced data, big data
Mission	Offenders perceive themselves as crusaders who hope to cleanse the earth of evil	Social media postings, crowd-sourced data, big data

RELATIONSHIP WITH THE POLICE AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS

It is essential for interrupters to be viewed as non-threatening to potential perpetrators. Being associated with the police or other law enforcement officials (hereinafter referred to simply as “law enforcement” for simplicity) can be perceived as threatening. This can exasperate the individual or group, causing them to dismiss any type of intervention. It can lead also to the individual’s or group’s situation deteriorating and the hastening of violent conduct. Therefore, introducing law enforcement in the initial stages of the interruption model should be avoided in order to attempt to effectively establish a trusting relationship with potential perpetrators.

However, there are times when an interrupter must contact law enforcement authorities. This is when the perpetrator is belligerent, disinclined to being talked out of violence, and showing signs of preparing for violence.

It is also advisable to develop relationships with law enforcement in the developmental stages of the program, before the potential perpetrators are known to the interrupters. Both the interrupters and law enforcement have the same end goal in mind—no violence. Law enforcement can be an accumulator of information as they are the ones who receive significant community-level information as a result of their daily job functions. They may witness events and hear information (including rumors) that could be of helpful to interrupters. Law enforcement is often contacted by people sharing information concerning individuals who are beginning to go against societal norms by exhibiting violent tendencies. Even when law enforcement officials investigate

there is often very little they can do legally unless a law is broken, or the individual in question is deemed to be harmful to themselves or others. Typically, once law enforcement authorities depart, there is no more oversight of that individual’s actions. In contrast, an NGO using the interruption model can provide follow-up monitoring and early intervention even when there is no legal basis for law enforcement to be engaged.

With hate-motivated violence, there is an emphasis on whether law enforcement has legal authority to respond to red flags of potential violence. The idea behind red flagging is, of course, to use conflict early warning for an effective early response. The assumption is for law enforcement to step in using an Extreme Risk Protection Order (ERPO), sometimes taking away guns and ammunition from a potential perpetrator or group of potential perpetrators. This approach has been criticized, of course, for not allowing sufficient due process. There are also concerns expressed about violations of privacy when data are analyzed for early warnings without consent.

Using the interruption model has the potential to significantly expand the capacity for early warning and effective early response prior to the times in which law enforcement officials would have sufficient evidence to take action. It is helpful to view this along a timeline, depicted in the Figure 3. Our hope is that organizations outside of law enforcement can intervene during Phases 1, 2, 4 and 6, thereby significantly enhancing the chances of interrupting violence.




Figure 3: Stages of hate-motivated violence and interruption, likely applying only to defensive and retaliatory categories.

PROJECT DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

PART II

PROJECT CONCEPTUALIZATION

It is important for the success of projects that they be housed within well-established, sustainably funded, prone-to-listening NGOs, social enterprises or foundations. It is a waste of resources, talent and time to build such an enterprise in a flash of enthusiasm. There must be a strategic planning and functional design steering committee which is comprised, especially at the very beginning, of people who are closest to the problem, who will benefit from this initiative. Steering committee members should typically include subject matter experts, government officials, social service and community leaders, leaders of faith communities, and business leaders.

The project design, implementation and subsequent testing will require:

1. adaptation of the model to hate-motivated violence;
2. implementation of the model as a pilot in multiple geographic areas; and
3. a formal analysis of the pilot programs with the intention of developing a scalable system to implement more broadly.

The adaptation process should include an in-depth assessment that includes surveying relevant data and publications, conducting interviews with subject matter experts and those closest to this form of violence (individuals in public health, community based organizations, behavioral-health professionals, hate-motivated violence prevention professionals), and local justice systems. This assessment should seek to identify the existing treatments for those at-risk for involvement in hate motivated violence, the criteria for identifying those at risk for involvement, methods of detecting and interrupting imminent hate-motivated violence, the trigger events that can lead to this form of violence, and the dynamics of the norms that affect utilization of services, such as mental health treatment. The assessment should also identify potential geographic areas for implementing pilot programs. Potential consideration should be given to selecting areas that are urban, rural, and suburban in order to learn about how to implement the model in different contexts.

USING INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES

It is important that there be an ICT component to an initiative applying the interruption model to address hate-motivated violence because ICTs are integral to early warning in cases of violence that is random and geographically dispersed. We recommend using ICTs consisting of at least these components:

1. A **digital mapping and crowdsourcing component** to solicit information from members of a trusted group of staff and volunteers (a “trust network”), as well as the general public (the “crowd”), for tracking events and signals regarding conflict and cooperation, creating an early warning system as well as a visualization and analytical tool. [Ushahidi Enterprise](#) is an example of this kind of service. The approach CV and its implementing partners have used to date mainly involves training a select group of staff members to maintain situational awareness in hot zones. By using ICTs, however, the numbers of observers will be markedly enhanced. Increased hate group activity tends to animate people who seek to counter those groups’ influence.⁶ This is likely to enhance the propensity of crowds to engage in crowdsourcing for conflict early warning. People should be encouraged to send in information in real-time. This includes texts, email, photos and videos. Increased hate group activity tends to animate people who seek to counter those groups’ influence.⁷ This is likely to enhance the propensity of crowds to engage in crowdsourcing for conflict early warning. Assuming the Geographic Information Systems (GIS) of their phones are turned on, the information will be geo-coded and time stamped. Information from a trust network can be posted onto a digital map instantaneously. Information from the crowd should be vetted and verified before it is posted.⁸
2. A **mass texting component** that can be used to disseminate messages to selected groups of people, which can be important in norm change campaigns and in preventing panic when rumors start. [t](#) is an example of this kind of service, and it can be used in conjunction with Ushahidi.
3. Assuming privacy concerns and ethical issues are overcome, a **data mining component** enables analysis of information flowing on the internet.⁹ One data mining service, [Geofeedia](#), is a location-based analytics

software, which is helpful in keeping track of social media traffic in specific locations. Another is [Echosec](#), which also harvests data flowing on the internet. It has a specific application designed to mine data on the dark web, called [Beacon](#).¹⁰

We want to reiterate that it is important that careful consideration be given to privacy concerns and ethical issues in using these technologies. As stated above, the main criticism leveled against data mining platforms is that civil liberties can be compromised, infringing on people’s privacy. The main criticism of crowdsourcing platforms is that the information provided by members of the crowd can potentially be used against them.¹¹

TYPES OF DATA

Any initiative will need a central place for processing data, such as a headquarters. Data should be gathered from both passive and active sources. Sources of passively acquired data include, but are not limited to:

- Crime data (which can be analyzed over time to identify locations of epidemics, potentially using epidemiological models)
- Geographically specific social media postings

Sources of actively acquired, crowdsourced data are:

- Text messages
- Emails
- Social media posts
- Pictures
- Videos

MONITORING AND EVALUATION

The proposed adaptation and its field testing must involve a systematic and strategic process for understanding the problem of hate-motivated violence, establishing goals and target objectives, identifying and prioritizing key risk factors, and customizing intervention strategies, and must have a continuous evaluation and improvement process. It is critical that every project is dedicated to understanding, learning from, and correcting mistakes or unintended consequences. Assessment of potential risks and development of anticipatory mitigation strategies is a critical aspect of this process with any new model replication or adaptation.

CV has an extensive performance monitoring system to track the effectiveness of different adaptations of the model across implementation and adaptation sites. This data tracking system is a secure, password protected web-based platform that collects a variety of programmatic indicators inputted by the sites. For community violence prevention programs, data are captured on shootings, homicides and other violent incidents, conflict mediations, risk reduction efforts, community events, daily activities and organizational partnerships. Participant-level data tracks changes in participants over time and monitors participants’ progress in terms of use and acceptability of violence. The database also provides a robust reporting system which allows for continuous up-to-date monitoring of site progress and program fidelity including supervision indicators, daily briefings, team meeting agendas and attendance, and individual supervision. The database has a tiered level of access allowing each site to view its own data and providing access to all sites for Technical Assistance staff.

The database should be adapted to capture the program data indicators associated with efforts specific to addressing hate-motivated violence. This likely will include adaptations to worker daily logs (which track daily interactions with high risk individuals, community members, and families), the interruption forms (which track specific data related to actions taken to prevent a violent event), participant tracking forms (data on high risk individuals that staff members work with over time), community and participant activity tracking forms (indicators related to community training programs and other activities), and violent incident trends over time (for the selected target areas).

It is essential that external evaluators be involved from the early stages of adaptation efforts. Ideally, evaluators are not affiliated with the funders or leaders of the initiative. The CV Model is based on data and scientific evidence. Independent third-party evaluations provide insight for continuous program development at replication sites.

SUSTAINABILITY

Once an adaptation to the interruption model is developed to address hate-motivated violence, ideal long-term funders of the initiative are public safety or public health departments. There is no reason to assume this initiative can only be funded outside the ways and means of governments. It is our view that it would be best to add the costs of these initiatives to the public health department, in keeping with the epidemiological view and to ensure interrupters are clearly not law enforcement. It is important to ask if government budgets can be repurposed, so that these initiatives do not require additional tax revenue. Another approach is to issue municipal improvement bonds to finance an ongoing program. A third approach is to create a hybrid for-profit/not-for-profit enterprise. Or there could be a combination of these three approaches.




Figure 4: Ways to achieve sustainable funding

While governmental appropriations, issuance of municipal bonds, or a sustainable social enterprise, or all three, are needed for long-term funding, consider applying for funding from one of these foundations to conduct baseline research for writing a comprehensive proposal:

- AAA-ICDR Foundation
- Abbott
- Bernard Van Leer
- Charles Stewart Mott
- European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
- Ford Foundation
- Hewlett
- Irvin Stern
- McArthur Foundation
- Migrant and Refugee Fund
- National Endowment for Democracy (NED)
- Oak Foundation
- Public Welfare Foundation
- Riksbankens Jubileumsfond
- Sidrig Rausing Trust
- Stavros Niarchos Foundation
- The Fund for Global Human Rights
- The GSMA Foundation
- The Law Society
- The Norwegian Human Rights Fund (NHRF)
- The Open Society Foundations
- US Chamber and Commerce Foundation
- Wellcome Trust

CONCLUSION

WHAT IS SUCCESS?

One of the conundrums of violence prevention efforts is that it is difficult to determine whether violence would have occurred if there had not been an intervention. One way to cope with this challenge is to develop criteria of what constitutes an early warning, just as law enforcement does with what constitutes a red flag. Then, over a period of years, data can be gathered to determine the effectiveness of using the interruption model with hate-motivated violence. Efficacy of the approach can then be measured.

There has been a trend in recent years toward funding research involving randomized controlled trails. This has been a priority by, for instance, the National Institutes of Justice. Randomized controlled trails would likely involve comparing cases where there was no intervention to instances where there was intervention. If the adapted interruption model outlined in this manual is used, cases for comparison could be identified as those with early warnings, but with no intervention. This poses an ethical challenge that would, of course, need to be addressed with an institutional review board.

If researching the use of the interruption model to address hate-motivated violence, consider publishing your results in the Journal of Hate Studies, published by Gonzaga University.

WHAT IS REQUIRED FOR SUCCESS?

Successful adaptation of the Cure Violence model must involve a defined, multi-phase process which includes a scientific literature review (potentially with the help of a university research team), key stakeholder or informant interviews, and the hiring of experts to:

1. identify how to define potential target areas, develop criteria for target populations, and understand the context in which hate-motivated violence is likely to occur;
2. identify the criteria for credibility with the target population for recruitment and development of headquarters-based interrupters; (3) adapt detection and interruption strategies;
3. customize training materials; and
4. retrofit the Cure Violence database to capture additional program inputs related to this form of violence.

Key to success, and discussed throughout this manual, is the need to identify individuals with credibility who can interrupt this form of violence before it occurs. Employing persons from the

same “in-group” as interrupters, reduces defiance and engenders trust, credibility, and access. Several cognitive processes are sensitive to group membership and for assessing “us” or “them” (Mathur, Harada, Lipke, & Chiao, 2010; Bruneau, Dufour, & Saxe, 2012), and determining whether someone is working in his or her own interest or not.

What else is required for a successful adaptation of the interruption model to address hate-motivated violence? The main one is that there is a capacity to use Information and Communication Technologies, verification protocols, trend analysis and pattern recognition because those, taken together, are an electronic version of interrupters “having an ear to the ground.”

HATING THE HATE BUT NOT HATING THE HATER

The intent of this manual is not to sermonize. However, it is important to keep in mind when attempting to interrupt hate-motivated violence that potential perpetrators are likely to have experienced violence previously. For whatever reason, they are thinking, and maybe even concluding, that violence is their duty or their only possible course of action. An empathic disposition can be instrumental in keeping perspective and balance.

PART III

RESOURCES




Video 3: How to use Social Media Geofencing



The Cure Violence website has resources at www.cvg.org/resources

What follows, are videos that can help you understand some of the platforms you might want to consider.



Video 4: Deploying FrontlineSMS



Video 5: Crowdsourcing with Ushahidi

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ENDNOTES

¹ Initially called Ceasefire Health, Cure Violence was established in 1995 to address the epidemic of gun violence. It started as a program of the University of Illinois-Chicago’s School of Public Health. When it was converted into an NGO, it became Cure Violence Global.

² For two fascinating case studies on use of something like the interruption model to address hate-motivated violence, one about a Jewish organization in Britain, the Community Security Trust, and another about a group of Muslims in British India, the Nonviolent Servants of God, see Whine (2011) and Johansen (1997) respectively.

³ McCauley, Moskalkenko and Van Son report that these groups have a “perceived grievance, depression, a personal crisis (‘un-freezing’), and history of weapons use outside the military” (2013, p. 4).

⁴ We are grateful to Clark McCauley for pointing out the inherent difficulty of identifying early warning signs of hate-motivated violence pursued for a thrill.

⁵ Researchers are just beginning to get greater clarity on patterns of violence of different kinds. We recognize that comparing a pattern seen in ethnic riots to patterns seen in hate-motivated violence is problematic epistemologically. We believe, however, that the general pattern of violence involving precipitating events, lulls, and violence is generalizable. Future research will, of course, increase the precision of our understanding of patterns leading up to violence relative to type of violence.

⁶ Gambrell, Martin and Mungaray (2019) find evidence of increased activism in the face of growing communications by hate groups.

⁷ Gambrell, Martin and Mungaray (2019) find evidence of increased activism in the face of growing communications by hate groups.

⁸ Note that there are initiatives by schools to establish anonymous tip lines for reporting potential violence, bullying, suicide or drug use. Schools have found it important to have response mechanisms in place so that early warning results in early response. See Blad (2018).

⁹ According to Patton, McGregor and Slutkin, “Social media data (eg[sic], text, images, emojis, and hashtags) can allow for instant identification of risky behaviors, such as individuals brandishing guns, mentions of intent to commit violence, or discussions of

past violent actions” (2018, p. 2). For an example of how to develop a “lexicon” of terms for use in a data mining initiative, see Ferroggiaro et al. (2019).

¹⁰ The dark web is part of the Internet but it requires special software to access and communicate through it, thereby making much of the information inaccessible to others. It is therefore attractive to nefarious actors. For a helpful article on analyzing big data to identify hot spots, see Bogomolov et. al (2015).

¹¹ Bock (2014) provides guidance on these ethical challenges.

¹² For an explanation of the use of deterministic models for this purpose, see Sooknanan and Comissiong (2017).

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